Aer Lingus has been a unique airline as it transitioned from a full service airline to a low cost carrier and is currently positioned as a Value Hybrid. It has co-existed with Ryanair for decades and faced numerous macroeconomic events that had a cascading effect on its commercial enterprise. Its transformation into a Value Hybrid in 2010 showcased its differenciation against Ryanair as it produced value-adding and consumer driven product differentiation beyond the basics of the low cost carrier product. The research aims to uncover the various strategies that were applied to structurally re-engineer the carrier.
2015 and a carrier highly valued by IAG, particarly since it began developing its hub as a mechanism to transfer traffic from UK and EU airports to North America (Walsh, 2015) . This paper aims to uncover the principle strategies that were applied to structurally re-engineer Aer Lingus to overcome its numerous challenges over the decades and to disclose the key underpinning strategies of its Value Hybrid business enterprise that made it such an attractive aquisition proposition for an IAG buyout.
Insert Figure 1 
Background of Aer Lingus

Aer Lingus: Its inception to 2001 -A Full Service Network Carrier
Aer Lingus was established in 1936 as Ireland's national airline. For decades, Ireland had one of the most stagnant aviation markets in Europe and it was perceived as an unattractive destination for new entrants. Agriculture remained the bedrock of employment and economic development; while data from the Irish Central Statistics Office (2015) reported that unemployment levels reached 17% in the 1980s while a 68% marginal tax rate prompted mass emigration to the US and to the UK. In addition, Ireland's tourism potential was suppressed by the continuing violence in Northern Ireland 2 , as the country as a whole was perceived to be in conflict. Tourism overall to Ireland, had been stagnant at 2 million visitors a year for two decades. Academics, classified the Irish flag carrier with all the symptoms and characteristics of 'Distressed State Airline Syndrome', an acronym linked with inefficiencies and bureaucracy stemming from State ownership (Doganis, 2001 and Barrett, 2006) . The
Irish incumbent suffered from an array of complications including: loss making (32 loss making years from 1936 -2014); strong unions (SIPTU, IMPACT and TEEU), which represent approximately 97% of Aer Lingus employees; overstaffing with 6,000 staff to carry 2.0 million passengers in 1977/78 (Barrett, 2006 ) -with no change over the next decade; bureaucratic management (Skinner and Cranitch, 1990) ; no clear development strategy (developed 40 non airline businesses (Share, 1986) ; poor service quality (high fares bundled with standard service, Barrett, 2006) ); together with constant government interference such as enforcing a compulsory Shannon airport stopover which prevented direct transatlantic flights to and from Dublin.
In 1986, Ireland became the first European country to allow a new market entrant to compete with its national airline on its major route, 11 years before EU deregulation in 1997.
This new challenger became known as Ryanair, which would forever change the dynamics of Aer Lingus and the EU short haul market. Barrett (1997) declared that Ryanair immediately offered fares more than 50% below the tariff of that charged by the Irish incumbent, while O'Connell and Williams (2005) calculated that Aer Lingus' unit costs (in terms of CASK)
were double that of Ryanair, making it very difficult for the flag carrier to compete.
By the early 1990s, the Irish incumbent faced a dual challenge because Ryanair continued to encroach on its markets and due to the first Gulf War, which plunged Aer
Lingus into a deep financial crisis, whereby it lost IR£116 million in 1993 and had debts accumulating IR£540 million, while transporting just 6.6 million passengers -this was worse than all other European airlines, with the exception of Olympic, while Swiss and Sabena had already declared bankruptcy. In an effort to restructure the losses, a rescue proposal termed the Cahill plan was inaugurated to reduce the workforce and restructure the business, while the Government injected IR£175m (£90m for redundancy payments with the balance used to reduce debt) -under new EU laws, this was the last time that Aer Lingus would receive any further subsidies. Wallace et al (2006) indicated that Industrial relation issues with the unions over redundancies were essential to this package as it endorsed that staff attrition of 1,500 employees accompanied the bailout, while the Government discredited the Aer Lingus board for their irresponsible management that incited its impending difficulties (House of the Oireachtas, 1993) . This package saved Aer Lingus. Over the following years, Aer Lingus capitalised on growth levels in the industry due the ongoing strong worldwide economic prosperity, while its earlier cost cutting measures were also contributing positively to its financials as it generated close to €120 million in net profit from 1995 -2000.
Aer Lingus: From 2001 to 2009 -A Low Cost Carrier
The global macro effects of the early 2000s spurred a series of catastrophic events that had a cascading effect on Aer Lingus. Principle among the factors that had precipitated the airline's early decline were scares over the Foot and Mouth disease in the UK and Ireland, which led to a major drop in traffic in one of its most important markets as UK traffic accounted for 3.6 million of the 6.9 million total traffic carried in 2000. Meanwhile, its profitable North
American operation was plunged into disarray as the technology stock crash in 2000, coupled with the 9/11 attacks, pushed the carrier deeper into financial crisis. The sudden fall in US traffic had disastrous consequences for Aer Lingus, which earned around 40% of its revenues and 50% of its profits from its North American operations (Aer Lingus, 2002 were required in order to restructure the airline and mount a formidable challenge to Ryanair.
In tandem, it implemented six core strategies that underpinned Aer Lingus' turnaround that included: a fare reduction of 37.5% on short haul routes coupled with a 25% reduction for the long haul; strengthened the network footprint togther with standardising to a single fleet type; realigned the human resource threshold while enhancing productivity; expediated its distribution mechanism to an online platform, retained the Aer Lingus' differentiated products; together with effective advertising (O'Connell, 2007 Tarry (2015) and Tiernan (2015) indicated that the airline had gone too far to the LCC side of the business model continuum, while Corneille (2015) commented that the long haul product was not good enough to be considered truly full service. upgrade to the features of a full service airline, whose characteristics are portrayed in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 The expert interviewees also commented that there was a need to unite the long haul and short haul aspects of the business. The transatlantic was undeveloped, with Fagan (2015) describing the north Atlantic as mostly point-to-point traffic. Barrett (2015) stated that Aer
Lingus had a strong tradition of trade union dominance, while Tiernan (2015) Seasonality is an inherent problem for Aer Lingus and its 2013 annual report reflects the reasoning as it is dominated by passengers travelling for leisure reasons, which represents 77% of its customer base, with holiday traffic representing 43% which is highly seasonal, followed by Visiting Friends and Relatives 28%, which is also seasonal in nature (Aer Lingus, 2013) . Heathrow slots (Irish Times, 2015) . The importanace of the Heathrow -Dublin route is evident, as it is the busiest air route in Europe (second busiest in the world, after Hong Kong -Taipei) amassing 4.5 million passengers in 2015 with 19 daily flights. The closure of the Gatwick base allowed for more frequencies to be allocated to key city-pairs as managments' attention began to emphasise the importance of 'frequency' when building its hub (Fagan, 2015) .
Insert Figure 2
Cost based reduction and revenue generating products Figure 3 shows that Aer Lingus unit costs compares favourably relative to other flag carriers, but sustains higher costs when paralleled to low cost carriers -a reflection of its hybrid business model. Aer Lingus has a 28% unit cost advanatge over Lufthansa, while easyJet has only a 16% improvement. It is clustered in the same proximtely as Air Berlin, another carrier running an explicit hybrid model but with slighly more advantageous unit costs. Table 2 illustrates the unit cost evolution over a five year period. Three cost categories in particular have escalated significantly over the years which include: fuel; airport charges; and ground charges. Firstly, Aer Lingus fuel hedging strategies occillated widely from a high of 77% of total uplift, hedged at $76 per tonne in 2010 to a low of 61% at $97.5 per tonne by 2014 -the carrier's low hedging policy coupled with purchasing the remainder of its fuel requirements at current maket prices, significantly increased the cost creep , 2010 , 2012 A cost saving plan termed 'Greenfield' was instigated by the senior management team in 2009 which was designed to remove €97 7 million over 3 years, which translated to the removal of 7.4% from its cost base, which was ambitious considering that a mandate of 3.1%
reductions were set for Air France and 2.6% for British Airways. In order to rightsize the airline, the plan included 863 voluntary job redundancies as well as pay cuts to those earning over €35,000 per year, while a three year pay freeze was introduced for others (CAPA, 2009).
Cabin crew productivity has notably increased from 700 hours per month in 2009 to 850
hours by 2011. The 13% fewer staff aggregated into savings of €53 million lowering the CASK per staff from 2009 to 2011 as shown in Table 2 .
During this period of cost cutting, the carrier also innovated its pricing strategy by unbundling its fare categories in order to reach a wider passenger segment by supplying different products at various price points via an a-la-carte mechanism, allowing it to compete more effectively with Ryanair. It introduced 3 customised fare options during 2010 titled 'Low', 'Plus' and 'Flex' with the 'Low' fare option being specific for carrying cabin bags only, while the 'Flex' captured all of the products associated with a business traveller including interchangeable tickets and full refunds. The 'Plus' fare choice allowed a passenger who was on travelling for vacation for example to include hold-baggage, seat selection and the ability to earn frequent flyer points. Insert Figure 3 Insert Table 2 Partnerships
The importance of partnerships to the Aer Lingus strategic turnaround was of paramount importance (Mueller, 2014) . It developed a bipartisan structure being split into code share agreements and innovative partnership agreements. Dennis (2000) asserted that there are significant benefits to the franchisor such as: being an inexpensive way to extend the brand; a means to continue to operate thin routes; a way to increase frequency; and as an instrument to generate feed traffic -all of which were incorporated. Aer Lingus also engaged the franchise to trial thin routes as a testbed before it inaugerated a low capacity A319 which allowed it seamlessley bridge the transition from a 65 seat ATR-72 to a 148 seat A319, minimising risk of route failure (Moores, 2013) .
Aer Lingus also implemented the unique strategy of simultaneously insourcing capacity from outside its own aircraft metal by partnering with Air Contractors to operate 3
B757s on Transatlantic routes (Kaminski-Morrow, 2013) . This allowed year round operations from Shannon and also provided an aircraft to operate a new route from Dublin to Toronto as they were ideally suited to thin low demand routes. Similar to Aer Arran strategy, the costs associated by incorporating a different aircraft type into the fleet were not borne by Aer
Lingus, while unions were appeased as one pilot on each 757 were sourced inhouse.
Meanwhile in a bid to maximise the benefits of strong summer demand on the North Atlantic, a Boeing 767 was concurrently leased from US based Omni Air International for 12 weeks (June to August) (CAPA, 2015) .
Developing the Hub and Engineering its Connectivity
All of the experts concurred that re-enginerring Aer Lingus' hub was the key linchpin that underpinned its turaround as it could capiatlise from Ireland's advantageous geographical position by capturing some the traditional traffic flows between Europe and North America. (Mueller, 2014; Doganis, 2014; Walsh, 2015) . This made it such an attractive proposition for an IAG buyout.
Aer Lingus' rudimentary Hub in 2008
Flag carriers that already operated rudimentary wave-system 8 at their home base in the early weekly summer flights across the North Atlantic and commanded almost 53% of the seat capacity. It had not engineering an architectural link to interweave its short haul network to its long haul at Dublin Airport -this was the linchpin that significantly weakened the carrier. Burghouwt's (2007) stated that a genuine hub must exist spatially and also have a temporal aspect reinforcing that Dublin was not a hub.
Insert Figure 4 Engineering the Hub Connectivity platform Lingus started to use the marketing slogan "arrive before you depart" to promote the facility.
The impact of Aer Lingus' underpinning focus on connectivity between the UK and Dublin is evident in Figure 5 as it illustrates that it is continuously gaining momentum and that it is a scalable business enterprise -there is particularly strong growth from 2012 onwards. The high frequency to Heathrow coupled with using the connecting time to clear US immigration has triggered a CAGR of 35% of passengers who connected in Dublin from 2011 to 2015.
Birmingham, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Gatwick all registered over 34% CAGR over the same period with Bristol recording 51% growth. The partnership with Stobart Air and the resultant development of a hub to cater for UK to US traffic has been an integral part Aer Lingus' strategic evolution and one of the key synergies driving the IAG takeover bid for Irish incumbent (Tarry, 2015) .
Insert Figure 5
An analysis on Aer Lingus' connectivity between Newcastle and the US
The connections are possible to 6 outbound US cities, with the connecting service to New York being just 70 minutes. Bootsma (1997) and Burghouwt (2007) claim that a 2-hour minimum connection time between a European and a continental destination is considered 'excellent', thus Aer Lingus can extrapolate that its connection quality is a highly attractive proposition for such travellers. However, the Toronto departure time of 13:50 results in a 4 hour 10 minute connection time which is an unattractive option for the customer. This design targets passengers travelling on thin markets where the traffic volume is not sufficient for non-stop flights. Table 4 reporting a 36% year on year growth for UK originating and connecting passengers.
Insert Table 4 Aer Lingus scaling up its European connectivity portfolio and New York routes. Clearly, the traffic leakage from these economically prosperous European countries through Aer Lingus' re-engineered hub triggered IAG to incorporate the Irish flag carrier and enlarge its North Atlantic footprint (Walsh, 2015) .
Aer Lingus' Hub by 2015 -its Evolution
Aer Lingus' competitive position is illustrated in the framework of a BCG matrix, which is an analytical tool that measures the dimensions of the carrier's relative market share against market growth rates as displayed in Figure 6 . The data was extracted over 12 months for 2015 to smoothen seasonality factors. The attractiveness and competitiveness of the growing Ireland -North American market is clear as the Irish incumbent is 4.2 times stronger than United Airlines, its nearest challenger. The matrix classifies it as a 'Star' market. It allocates the most seats (36%) to the UK market but it remains a follower due to Ryanair's dominance -this position has actually aided Aer Lingus as other carriers are not aggressively pursuing the market or absent (e.g. easyJet), while its principle differentiator, being its synchronising capability to incorporate seamless transfers with short connection times, which gives the passenger a different proposition from that of Ryanai r. Aer Lingus is also the leader on the Ireland -Western Europe corridor which is growing at the CAGR of 3.3%, while its Eastern European presence is negligible as Ryanair dominates with 4.7 times more seat capacity. This BCG snapshot illustrates the potential for evolving the Aer Lingus' hub. Barrett (2015) listed the iconic North Atlantic Brand, US pre-clearance and the neglect of UK regions by BA as the key success factors to Dublin's hub.
Insert Figure 6 By 2015 the bank structure had evolved considerably as shown in Figure 7 , its partnerships had facilitated more frequencies and encompass a wider network penetration. It tightened the co-ordination of the hub timetable in order to reduce the airport dwell time which creates an overall flight time as close as operationally possible to that of a non-stop schedule. Seredyński et al. (2014) found from analysing worldwide MIDT data that 85% of their sample passengers booked the fastest connections, while 13% book the second-fastest connections. The hub is extremely effective for passengers travelling from North America into the UK and Europe as the network is fully synchronised for seamless transfers with short connection times. Meanwhile the hub for UK passengers taking westbound flights is also very effective, but it is not fully optimised for mainland European flights as these westbound flights arrive into Dublin after the first wave of transatlantic aircraft have departed and travellers become burdened with a much longer dwell time before they can connect to the second wave. Fagan (2015) states that this spread is necessary as it forces European passengers onto the second wave as aircraft from the first wave are already reaching maximum capacity from passengers connecting from the UK. This paper investigated the strategies that were put in place to structurally re-engineer the carrier.
Analytical insights accompanied by expert interviews uncovered four principle strategies that restructured Aer Lingus' business model. Firstly, it has an inherent seasonality contention and it became unwavering in its capacity discipline, which had the dual impact of stronger yields and high load factors. Secondly, like other airlines across the globe, it continued to trim its cost base while improving productivity and efficiency measures;
however it did so in tandem with product enhancements that reached out to a wider passenger segmentation. Thirdly, as an independent carrier, it formulated a series of partnerships with select carriers that reached beyond its key gateways, while it also adopted a dual approach to its capacity management by outsourcing aircraft on a wet lease basis, without commercial risk, while insourcing capacity outside its own aircraft metal. It fabricated a paradigm franchise with Stobart Air that had the network footprint that penetrated small UK regional airports, which would be an essential building block for feed traffic to Aer Lingus. Fourthly and most critically, it structurally re-engineered its hub at Dublin airport. 7. This €97 million cost reduction would come from: Pilots €30 million; Cabin crew; €20 million; Support staff, €16 million; Airport charges, €10 million; Other staff, €9 million; Non-other staff costs, €4 million; Advertising, €3 million; Distribution, €3 million; and Maintenance, €2 million (Source: Aer Lingus corporate).
8. This is an efficient means of co-coordinating incoming 'spoke' traffic with departing flights at a carriers' home base. The strategy involves combining point-to-point traffic with transferring passengers originating from the points at the end of each spoke of the hub. Whereas the point-to-point traffic terminates at the hub, the transferring passengers pass through and depart to other domestic or international destinations on the hub's spoke network. The science involves the synchronisation of incoming flights to provide maximum feed for departing aircraft waiting to take-up their multi-origin share of incoming passengers. This form of scheduling creates a bank of many incoming flights arriving almost simultaneously, followed by a wave of departures. This method serves as an effective traffic multiplier.
9. The Air Passenger Duty (APD) Tax is excessive, as a journey from the UK to the US West Coast for the summer of 2014 would induce a tax ranging from £69 to £170 GBP (UK Government, 2015).
10. Terminal 2 opened in November 2010 with an area of 75,000 m 2 at a construction cost of €923 million. It increases the airport's passenger capacity to more than 30 million passengers a year. All of the long-haul carriers have moved to T2, including Aer Lingus to where it relocated all of its mainline operations (Dublin Airport, 2015; Irish Times, 2013) .
11. From Ireland (Dublin and Shannon airports), in the summer of 2015, Aer Lingus operated 74 flights a week to the US and commanded 46.2% seat capacity market share, while it offered 7 services a week to Canada but held just 20.5% market share. Out of Dublin, Aer Lingus operated 61 flights a week to the US with 49.1% market share, while to Canada it conducts 7 flights a week with a 17.7% market share (Source: OAG data). Source: MIDT and OAG data 02:00 -04:00 04:00 -06:00 06:00 -07:00 07:00 -08:00 08:00 -09:00 09:00 -10:00 10:00 -11:00 11:00 -12:00 12:00 -13:00 13:00 -14:00 14:00 -15:00 15:00 -16:00 16:00 -17:00 17:00 -18:00 18:00 -20:00 20:00 -22:00 22:00 -24:00 Flights from Dublin
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